Tag Archives: security

Why Go?

A few weeks ago I was asked by a friend, “why should I care about Go”? They knew that I was passionate about Go, but wanted to know why I thought other people should care. This article contains three salient reasons why I think Go is an important programming language.


As individuals, you and I may be perfectly capable of writing a program in C that neither leaks memory or reuses it unsafely. However, with more than 40 years of experience, it is clear that collectively, programmers working in C are unable to reliably do so en masse.

Despite static code analysis, valgrind, tsan, and -Werror being available for a decades, there is scant evidence those tools have achieved widespread acknowledgement, let alone widespread adoption. In aggregate, programmers have shown they simply cannot safely manage their own memory. It’s time to move away from C.

Go does not rely on the programmer to manage memory directly, instead all memory allocation is managed by the language runtime, initialized before use, and bounds checked when necessary. It’s certainly not the first mainstream language that offered these safety guarantees, Java (1995) is probably a contender for that crown. The point being, the world has no appetite for unsafe programming languages, thus Go is memory safe by default.

Developer productivity

The point at which developer time became more expensive than hardware time was crossed back in the late 1970s. Developer productivity is a sprawling topic but it boils down to this; how much time do you spend doing useful work vs waiting for the compiler or hopelessly lost in a foreign codebase.

The joke goes that Go was developed while waiting for a C++ program to compile. Fast compilation is a key feature of Go and a key recruiting tool to attract new developers. While compilation speed remains a constant battleground, it is fair to say that compilations which take minutes in other languages, take seconds in Go.

More fundamental to the question of developer productivity, Go programmers realise that code is written to be read and so place the act of reading code above the act of writing it. Go goes so far as to enforce, via tooling and custom, that all code by formatted in a specific style. This removes the friction of learning a project specific language sub-dialect and helps spot mistakes because they just look incorrect.

Due to a focus on analysis and mechanical assistance, a growing set of tools that exist to spot common coding errors have been adopted by Go developers in a way that never struck a chord with C programmers—Go developers want tools to help them keep their code clean.


For more than a decade, chip designers have been warning that the free lunch is over. Hardware parallelism, from the lowliest mobile phone to the most power hungry server, in the form of more, slower, cpu cores, is only available if your language can utilise them. Therefore, concurrency needs to be built into the software we write to run on today’s hardware.

Go takes a step beyond languages that expose the operating system’s multi-process or multi-threading parallelism models by offering a lightweight concurrency model based on coroutines, or goroutines as they are known in Go. Goroutines allows the programmer to eschew convoluted callback styles while the language runtime makes sure that there will be just enough threads to keep your cores active.

The rule of three

These were my three reasons for recommending Go to my friend; safety, productivity, and concurrency. Individually, there are languages that cover one, possibly two of these domains, but it is the combination of all three that makes Go an excellent choice for mainstream programmers today.

IoT p0wnership

The recent total war bombardment of Brian Krebs’ site, and the subsequent allegation that the traffic emanated from compromised home routers, cameras, baby monitors, doorbells, thermostats, and whatnot, got me thinking.

So DDoS is a thing, and as much as I enjoy the lampooning of IoT by everyone’s favourite wat account, @internetofshit, I wonder if the status quo of insecure consumer devices will have an unexpected knock-on effect.

Previously, DDoS traffic was assumed to come from compromised servers (waves hand in the approximate direction of the cloud) or malware infected PCs. For the former, cloud providers have gotten pretty good at rooting out insecure hosts and booting them off their networks, and organised crime have pretty much figured out that deleting stuff of people’s home computer is less profitable than encrypting said stuff and holding it for ransom. There’s always the chance of someone spotting unexpected outbound traffic from a box — that is one thing the host based AV industry does seem to be good at — because there’s usually a human sitting in front of the device whenever it’s awake. But not so with the cable router or ADSL modem sitting under the hall table, or the IP connected baby monitor you installed in the nursery, or the hundreds of other IP connected whatevers produced for the lowest possible cost because that is what we, as consumers, demand; price, the ultimate arbiter of quality.

My home router, what's it doing? I've got no idea.

My home router. What’s it doing? I’ve got no idea.

Homes filled with tiny linux boxes running weak software are a tempting target. Not just because owning them is easy, but as long as the devices continue to work as reliably as they did before compromise, nobody is going to suspect that their excess capacity is being soaked up under someone else’s control. Embedded devices have other attractive properties, they’re usually online 24/7, not sporadically like a laptop trying to conserve battery power, and commonly enjoy a wired ethernet connection, not the whims of a rapidly changing WiFi network. Can any of you reading this post tell me that you know the provenance of every packet that leaves your home network?

But back to Krebs and the IP cameras. With the nose dive in desktop and laptop sales, it’s pretty clear that the botnet action has moved to the embedded space. Assuming the attribution is correct, then DDoS has gone from being manageable to very not manageable, quickly. It’s the early 2000’s spam wars all over again, and companies that make real money on the internet are going expect a solution. And when I say solution, I mean litigation.

Who’s to blame for shitty insecure consumer devices? Who’s going to receive the summons?

Will it be the local ISPs, or carriers? Unlikely. In the States, carriers enjoy common carrier status which indemnifies them from crimes committed using their service. In Australia the situation is less clear but the message isn’t. ISPs are not interested in policing the behaviour of the users of that service. If you’re Walmart who’s been forced offline by 1Tbps of traffic during the holiday sales, you can forget about suing ISPs.

Ok, what about the device manufacturers themselves? I’ll be honest, I don’t have the stamina to read the EULA paperwork that comes with a device so I cannot assert this as a fact, but I would be amazed if the liability for the damage the device did, if not expressly waived by opening the box, exceeded the purchase price. Looking towards other industries, car manufacturers are not liable for the damage their vehicles do in the case of misuse, which is why in many parts of the world licensing a vehicle to drive on a public road requires compulsory third party insurance.

Let’s cut to the chase, the reason IoT DDoS is a thing is because the security of the software inside those devices is laughable. You can debate about why this is why it is, but that does not change the fact that all the other members of this supply chain have deftly sidestepped the buck on this one, and so the liability for insecure software rests with us, the authors of said software. Because, as Robert C. Martin likes to remind us, software rules the world, so programmers rule the world.

Serious stuff.

Serious stuff.

If you look at the history of unsafe products; food, paint, hair spray, electrical goods, governments have forced manufacturers to improve with a combination of regulations and import controls. In Australia, for example, it is illegal to import a product that connects to the mains supply unless its plug has the correct shroud over the live and neutral pins. This is how governments work, they cut off a manufacturer’s air supply by forbidding them from importing their products into the country. That tends to effect change, smartly.

Will IoT be the tipping point that forces the software industry to adopt voluntary, or mandatory, regulation or procedural standardisation?